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A MEANINGFUL FLOOR FOR
“MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL”
Rebecca Crootof *
I. INTRODUCTION
To the extent there is any consensus among States, ban advocates, and ban
skeptics regarding the regulation of autonomous weapon systems (AWS), it is
grounded in the idea that all weaponry should be subject to ―meaningful human
control.‖ This ―intuitively appealing‖ principle is immensely popular, and
numerous States have explicitly declared their support for it or questioned the
lawfulness of weapons that operate without such control. Lack of opposition has

* Executive Director, Yale Information Society Project; Research Scholar and Lecturer in Law,
Yale Law School. Thanks to Duncan Hollis and the other organizers of Autonomous Legal
Reasoning? Legal and Ethical Issues in the Technologies of Conflict for the opportunity to
explore this issue; thanks to Kenneth Anderson and other symposium participants for helpful
commentary on earlier drafts.
1. An autonomous weapon system is ―a weapon system that, based on conclusions derived
from gathered information and preprogrammed constraints, is capable of independently selecting
and engaging targets.‖ Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837 (2015); see U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO.
3000.09: AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13–14 (2012); INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED
CONFLICTS 44 (2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-andchallenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts [hereinafter ICRC REPORT] (―‗[A]utonomous weapon
systems‘ is an umbrella term that would encompass any type of weapon systems, whether
operating in the air, on land or at sea, with autonomy in its ‗critical functions,‘ meaning a weapon
that can select . . . and attack . . . targets without human intervention.‖).
2. Michael Biontino (Chairperson of the Informal Meeting of Experts), Report of the 2015
Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN OFF. GENEVA
(2015) at 11, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2015/Draft
Report.pdf [hereinafter Biontino Report] (―There seems to be a widespread understanding that
both the legal and ethical acceptability of a weapon system would require some kind of human
control.‖).
3. U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, THE WEAPONIZATION OF INCREASINGLY
AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES: CONSIDERING HOW MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL MIGHT
MOVE THE DISCUSSION FORWARD 2 (2015) [hereinafter UNIDIR REPORT].
4. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, COUNTRY POLICY POSITIONS (2015),
http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/KRC_CCWexperts_Countries_25
Mar2015.pdf (compiling statements from States regarding meaningful human control). As this
paper was being finalized for publication, the 2016 CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal
Autonomous Weapon Systems was concluding. As in past years, States voiced support for
maintaining meaningful human control over weapons; and, as in past years, what that entailed
remained contested. Chris Ford & Chris Jenks, The International Discussion Continues: 2016
CCW Experts Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapons, JUST SEC. (Apr. 20, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/30682/2016-ccw-experts-meeting-laws/; Kelley Sayler, More of the
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led some to conclude that it is either a newly developed customary norm or a preexisting, recently exposed rule of customary international law, already binding on
all States.
But this broad support comes at a familiar legislative cost; there is no
consensus as to what ―meaningful human control‖ actually requires. State X might
define meaningful human control to require informed human approval of each
possible action of a given weapon system (maintaining a human being ―in the
loop‖); State Y might understand it as the ability of a human operator to oversee
and veto a weapon system‘s actions (having a human being ―on the loop‖); and
State Z might view the original programming alone as providing sufficiently
meaningful human control (allowing human beings to be ―off the loop‖). As the
Czech Republic noted, in voicing its belief that ―the decision to end somebody‘s
life must remain under meaningful human control, . . . [t]he challenging part is to
establish what precisely ‗meaningful human control‘ would entail.‖
This paper describes attempts to clarify what factors are relevant to
meaningful human control, discusses benefits associated with retaining
imprecision in a standard intended to regulate new technology through
international consensus, and argues that the standard‘s vagueness should be limited

Same: The UN Debate on Lethal Robots, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE (Apr. 27, 2016),
http://dronecenter.bard.edu/more-of-the-same-the-un-debate-on-lethal-robots/.
5. Peter Asaro, Jus Nascendi, Robotic Weapons and the Martens Clause, in ROBOT LAW
(Ryan Calo, Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds.) (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author)
(―[T]here is already an emerging norm concerning meaningful human control over the targeting
of weapons and the use of violent force . . . .‖); see also Michael C. Horowitz & Paul Scharre,
Meaningful Human Control in Weapon Systems: A Primer 7 (Ctr. for New Am. Sec., Working
Paper No. 031315, 2015), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/Ethical_Auton
omy_Working_Paper_031315.pdf (describing two main schools of thought regarding the
principle‘s legal status).
6. This understanding is favored by pro-ban advocates as it essentially permits only the
development and use of semi-autonomous weapon systems. See Thomas Nash, Director, Article
36, Remarks to the CCW on Autonomous Weapons Systems (May 15, 2014),
http://www.article36.org/statements/701/ (―[M]eaningful human control . . . can be seen to
require deliberative moral reasoning, by human beings, over individual attacks. Weapons that do
not allow such human control and attacks without such human control should be prohibited.‖);
Kelsey D. Atherton, The International Community is About to Debate Killer Robots, POPULAR
SCI. (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.popsci.com/international-community-is-about-to-debate-killerrobots (quoting Mark Guburd: ―‗If a (non-human) system makes a decision under internal
programming plus environmental inputs, that is not human control. . . . You may have
programmed it, and you may be satisfied that it is making the right decisions, but you are not
controlling it when it makes those decisions. . . . The whole point of calling something
autonomous is that it is operating outside of human control, making decisions on its own.‘‖).
7. See Charli Carpenter, Dynamics of Debate at the Experts Meeting on Autonomous
Weapons, DUCK OF MINERVA (May 15, 2014), http://duckofminerva.com/2014/05/dynamics-ofdebate-at-the-experts-meeting-on-autonomous-weapons.html (―A U.S. delegate implied yesterday
that autonomous weapons would of course be controlled by humans because as the creators of
these weapons we are responsible for their programming.‖).
8. Statement of the Czech Republic, CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems, Geneva, April 1317, 2015, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(http
Assets)/2DD5110A33C9C2D2C1257E26005DD47B/$file/2015_LAWS_MX_Czech+Republic.p
df.

by an interpretive floor. ―Meaningful human control‖ as a regulatory concept can
usefully augment existing humanitarian norms governing targeting—namely, that
all attacks meet the treaty and customary international law requirements of
distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions. However, it should not be
interpreted to conflict with these norms nor be prioritized in a way that undermines
existing humanitarian protections.
II. INHERENT IMPRECISION
The phrase ―meaningful human control‖ was first influentially used in a
briefing paper to the 2014 Experts Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapon
Systems. The paper raised important questions that still warrant discussion: what
type of human control should be exercised over autonomous weapon systems? At
what point is that control no longer meaningful? To what extent can computer
programming augment or even constitute human control?
In part because it is so difficult to pin down precisely what is uniquely
concerning about AWS —especially given that so many automatic, semiautonomous, and even quietly autonomous weapons are in use today —this phrase
quickly captured the collective imagination. Pro-ban advocates have even begun
to define AWS as those that operate ―without‖ or ―beyond‖ meaningful human
control. But there are nearly as many understandings of what meaningful human

9. Cf. Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIR. J. INT‘L L. 795 (2010) (discussing these
requirements and arguing that there is no need to consider an independent ―military necessity‖ or
―humanity‖ requirement, as both are implicitly considered and balanced in the other
requirements).
10. Key Areas for Debate on Autonomous Weapon Systems, ARTICLE 36 (May 2014),
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/A36-CCW-May-2014.pdf.
11. Id. at 2.
12. See generally Michael C. Horowitz, The Ethics & Morality of Robotic Warfare:
Assessing the Debate Over Autonomous Weapons, 145 J. OF AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCI. 25 (Fall
2016).
13. See Crootof, supra note 1, at 1863–72 (describing various autonomous weapons
systems in use today); see also Autonomous Weapons: Decisions to Kill and Destroy Are A
Human Responsibility, INT‘L COMM. RED CROSS (Apr. 2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/document
/statement-icrc-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems [hereinafter ICRC Statement] (―Some
weapon systems in use today can select and attack targets without human intervention.‖).
14. See, e.g., ICRC Statement, supra note 13 (―Whether for legal, ethical or militaryoperational reasons, there is broad agreement on the need for human control over weapons and
the use of force.‖).
15. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT‘L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH.,
MIND THE GAP: THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLER ROBOTS 1 (2015),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms0415_ForUpload_0.pdf [hereinafter MIND
THE GAP] (―Fully autonomous weapons, also known as ‗killer robots,‘ raise serious moral and
legal concerns because they would possess the ability to select and engage their targets without
meaningful human control.‖); The United Kingdom and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems,
ARTICLE 36, at 1 (2016), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/UK-andLAWS.pdf (―The defining feature of lethal autonomous weapons systems is that they would be
systems that operate without meaningful human control.‖).
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control entails as there are writers on the subject.
Certainly, there are identifiable situations at the far poles of the spectrum.
When a well-trained and informed person monitors and approves every action
taken by a weapon system, there is little doubt that she is exercising meaningful
human control. When a poorly trained, uninformed person ―robotically‖ pushes a
button every time a red light goes on, she is merely a human rubber stamp—and
likely a legal and moral scapegoat.
But the grey area is wide, and full of complicated situations. For example, the
speed of cyber actions makes automatic and even autonomous cyber defenses
increasingly desirable. As a result, ―in offensive cyberwarfare, [autonomous
weapon systems] may have to be deployed, because they will be integral to
effective action in an environment populated by automated defenses and taking
place at speeds beyond human capacities.‖ In both cyber defense and offense,
requiring in-time human approval for every action would be a dangerous
impediment. What should the standard for meaningful human control be in
cyberspace? And should it differ from the standard governing weaponry in other
realms?
There is a growing scholarly literature attempting to clarify what factors are
relevant to establishing meaningful human control. In early 2014, the
International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) proffered three
―minimum necessary conditions for meaningful [human] control‖ :
16. See ICRC Statement, supra note 13 (noting the need for clarity about what ―kind and
degree of human control‖ should be exercised, ideally in a way that satisfies legal, ethical, and
military-operational concerns).
17. Meaningful Human Control, Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Weapons, ARTICLE
36 (2016), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-AI-and-AWS-FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter Article 36, MHC] (―At its most basic level, the requirement for MHC develops from
two premises: (1) That a machine applying force and operating without any human control
whatsoever is broadly considered unacceptable. (2) That a human simply pressing a ‗fire‘ button
in response to indications from a computer, without cognitive clarity or awareness, is not
sufficient to be considered ‗human control‘ in a substantive sense.‖). cf. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, No
One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous Targeting, 67 JOINT FORCE Q., 4th
Quarter at 77, 83 (2012) (noting that oversight would not be effective if the human operator were
merely just a rubber stamp to approve an engagement); M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones:
Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction (Mar. 20, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (discussing how individuals may become ―moral crumple zones‖ in accidents involving
human/algorithmic interactions).
18. See Eric Messinger, Is It Possible to Ban Autonomous Weapons in Cyberwar?, JUST
SEC. (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/19119/ban-autonomous-weapons-cyberwar/
(―The nature of the battlefield in question and the character of cyber defense will dictate the
capabilities necessary for effective offensive operations, and the trend will be toward autonomous
systems.‖).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Key Elements of Meaningful Human Control, ARTICLE 36 (2016),
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-2016-FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter
Article 36, Key Elements]; Article 36, MHC, supra note 17.
21. Frank Sauer, ICRAC Statement on Technical Issues to the 2014 UN CCW Expert
Meeting, ICRAC INT‘ L COMM. FOR ROBOT ARMS CONTROL (May 14, 2014), icrac.net/2014/05/
icrac-statement-on-technical-issues-to-the-un-ccw-expert-meeting
[hereinafter
ICRAC
Statement].

1. ―[A] human commander (or operator) must have full contextual and
situational awareness of the target area and be able to perceive and
react to any change or unanticipated situations that may have arisen
since planning the attack‖;
2. ―[T]here must be active cognitive participation in the attack and
sufficient time for deliberation on the nature of the target, its
significance in terms of the necessity and appropriateness of attack,
and likely incidental and possible accidental effects of the attack‖;
and
3. ―[T]here must be a means for the rapid suspension or abortion of the
attack.‖
Soon after, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) reviewed the existing
literature and concluded that there are three ―essential components‖ to meaningful
human control:
1. Human operators are making informed, conscious decisions about
the use of weapons.
2. Human operators have sufficient information to ensure the
lawfulness of the action they are taking, given what they know about
the target, the weapon, and the context for action.
3. The weapon is designed and tested, and human operators are
properly trained, to ensure effective control over the use of the
weapon.
More recently, Article 36 has argued that ―meaningful human control‖ requires
1. ―[p]redictable, reliable and transparent technology‖;
2. ―[a]ccurate information for the user on the outcome sought, the technology,
and the context of use‖;
3. ―[t]imely human judgement and action, and a potential for timely
intervention‖; and
4. ―[a]ccountability to a certain standard.‖
The International Committee of the Red Cross, meanwhile, has stated that
―meaningful human control‖ entails ―strict operational constraints with respect to
the task carried out, the targets attacked, the operational environment, the
geographical space and time of operation, the scope to enable human oversight of
the weapon system, and the human ability to deactivate it if need be.‖
Drilling down on the relevant factors shifts the terms of the debate in a
productive way—but it does not eliminate the principle‘s inherent imprecision.
With regard to the CNAS definition, for example, instead of arguing over what
―meaningful‖ or ―control‖ demands, States will likely debate what constitutes
―informed decisions,‖ ―sufficient information,‖ or ―proper training.‖
22. Id.
23. Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 5, at 4.
24. Article 36, Key Elements, supra note 20, at 1.
25. ICRC Statement, supra note 13.
26. Additionally, as Marc Canellas and Rachel Haga point out, significantly more precision
will be necessary before the standard can be practically applied at the design level. Marc C.
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Additionally, broader questions remain unresolved. Should control be exercised
over the entire weapon system, or perhaps only over its ―critical functions‖? If so,
what functions are ―critical‖? Alternatively, perhaps meaningful human control
must be exercised over individual attacks, regardless of whether an AWS may be
employed? If so, there are different aspects of an attack, each of which may be
subject to different degrees of human control, including (1) why someone or
something is targeted; (2) how force is used; (3) who or what is harmed by the
attack (both directly and indirectly); (4) when force is applied or harm is
experienced; and (5) where force is applied and harm is experienced.
Furthermore, there is still no agreement as to the level of decision-making at which
human control must occur. The commander determining the rules of engagement
is exercising a certain kind of control, the commander ordering a particular attack
is exercising another, and the individual implementing that order might exercise
yet another kind of control.
Given the difficulty in pinning down what ―meaningful human control‖
actually requires, ―[s]everal states [have] expressed skepticism over the added
value of the suggested concept, assessing it as being too vague, subjective and
unclear.‖
III. BENEFITS TO IMPRECISION IN INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY REGULATION
It may well be, however, that the principle‘s indefiniteness is its strength.
International law is built on State consensus, and it is often easier to get States to
first agree to a progressive but vague statement or principle—say, that everyone
has the right to life —and later hash out what it actually entails, given different
stances on issues like abortion and capital punishment. Meaningful human
Canellas & Rachel A. Haga, Toward Meaningful Human Control of Autonomous Weapons
Systems Through Function Allocation, INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS
ENGINEERS, 6 (2015) (suggesting that ―the effective function allocation literature provides a
framework for designing rules and standards for AWS‖).
27. See UNIDIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (questioning whether meaningful human
control should be exercised over weapons systems, over critical functions of autonomous
weapons, or over individual attacks).
28. See ICRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 44 (defining ―critical functions‖ as those relating to
―selecting and attacking targets‖).
29. See Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 5, at 15 (raising similar questions); see also Maya
Brehm, Presentation to the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
1–2 (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/897D1C5358C307
BDC1257E280028024B/$file/BREHM_Presentation+on+MHC_14.04.2015.pdf
(highlighting
different aspects of an attack over which human control may be exercised).
30. Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 5, at 15.
31. Id.
32. Biontino Report, supra note 2, at 13; see also id. at 17 (―Meaningful human control may
be useful as a policy approach to address shortcomings in current technology. However, it should
not be applied as a legal criterion as this could undermine existing targeting law by introducing
ambiguity.‖).
33. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
34. Cf. Brian Israel, Treaty Stasis, AJIL UNBOUND (May 8, 2014),
http://asil.org/blogs/treaty-stasis-agora-end-treaties (―Relatively open-textured treaties that

control, as a phrase, is particularly useful in that it invites commentary and
interpretation from a wide variety of stakeholders, including State representatives,
weapon designers and manufacturers, human rights activists, philosophers, and (of
course) lawyers. Additionally, flexible terms that simultaneously draw a line
prohibiting certain extreme developments while allowing for adaptive
interpretations are of particular use in law intended to regulate new technology,
especially weapons technologies.
Take, for example, the two existing and similarly imprecise restrictions on
new weaponry. A weapon cannot be ―by nature indiscriminate,‖ which is to say,
it must be capable of being used in a way that discriminates between lawful targets
(combatants, civilians directly participating in an attack, and other military
objectives) and unlawful targets (civilians, civilian objects, and incapacitated or
surrendering combatants). Nor can a weapon ―cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering.‖ Both of these requirements are appealing in the abstract
prescribegeneral principles supply a framework for answering the governance questions that
inevitably arise over a treaty‘s lifetime with the advent of capabilities and activities not
expressly addressed by the treaty.‖).
35. Cf. Article 36, Key Elements, supra note 20, at 2 (noting that any modifier for ―human
control‖ would be ambiguous, but that ―meaningful‖ is preferable because ―it is general rather
than context specific (e.g. appropriate), derives from an overarching principle rather [than] being
outcome driven (e.g. effective, sufficient), and it implies human meaning rather than something
administrative, technical or bureaucratic‖); UNIDIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 (―[‗Meaningful
human control‘] provides a common language for discussion that is accessible to a broad range of
governments and publics regardless of their degree of technical knowledge. . . . It focuses on a
potentially shared objective of maintaining some form of control over all weapon systems . . . . It
is a concept broad enough to integrate consideration of ethics, human-machine interaction and the
‗dictates of the public conscience‘ which are often side-lined in approaches that narrowly
consider technology, law or functions.‖).
36. Cf. Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand
of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 185–86 (2001); Charles J. Dunlap, To Ban New
Weapons
or
Regulate
Their
Use?,
JUST
SECURITY
(Apr.
3,
2015),
https://www.justsecurity.org/21766/guest-post-ban-weapons-regulate-use/ (arguing for regulating
weapons‘ effects, rather than weapons themselves). But see Chris Reed, Taking Sides on
Technology Neutrality, 4 SCRIPT-ED 264, 280 (2007) (questioning the achievability and
desirability of tech-neutral regulations).
37. States Parties to the Geneva Conventions developing or acquiring new weapons are
required ―to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be
prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable.‖ Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 36, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Additional Protocol]. Many argue that this responsibility is one of
customary law, as it ―flows logically from the truism that States are prohibited from using illegal
weapons, means and methods of warfare or from using weapons, means and methods of warfare
in an illegal manner.‖ Int‘l Comm. of the Red Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of New
Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional
Protocol I of 1977, 88 INT‘L REV. RED CROSS 931, 933 (2006).
38. See, e.g., First Additional Protocol, supra note 37, art. 51(4); Rule 71. Weapons That
Are by Nature Indiscriminate, INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule71 (last visited Aug. 2, 2015).
39. See, e.g., Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive
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and clearly prohibit or permit the use of certain weapons at the extremes, but they
also allow for a fair amount of good faith disagreement about the lawfulness of a
weapon in the middle ground. For example, when advocates for a ban on antipersonnel landmines argued that they were already forbidden as inherently
indiscriminate, the United States countered that ―smart‖ anti-personnel mines,
which self-destruct or deactivate automatically, are not per se unlawful.
Notwithstanding—or perhaps because of—its inherent imprecision, a
proscription on weapons incapable of being meaningfully controlled might
usefully join existing prohibitions on new weaponry. While incorporating this
principle in States‘ legal reviews will not address all of the issues raised by AWS,
it will help concretize what meaningful human control actually means through
State practice. However, this principle will only be beneficial if it does not
undermine existing humanitarian norms governing targeting.
IV. AN INTERPRETATIVE FLOOR
All lawful attacks in an armed conflict must distinguish between lawful and
unlawful targets (the distinction requirement); must not cause excess collateral
damage relative to the anticipated military advantage (the proportionality

Projectiles, adopted Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, 138 Consol. T.S.
297; First Additional Protocol, supra note 37, art. 35(2); Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature to Cause
Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering, INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule70 (last visited Aug. 2, 2015).
40. See, e.g., Why the Ban, INT‘L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, http://www.icbl.org/engb/problem/why-the-ban.aspx (last visited Aug. 2, 2015).
41. See Emily Alpert, Why Hasn’t the U.S. Signed an International Ban on Landmines?,
L.A. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 5, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/04/minetreaty-us-ottawa-convention.html (discussing allusions by U.S. officials that the use of smart land
mines eliminated potential danger to civilians and therefore had a legitimate battlefield use).
42. Some have suggested that the meaningful human control principle could solve the AWS
accountability problem. Cf. Killer Robots and the Concept of Meaningful Human Control, HUM.
RTS. WATCH & & INT‘L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH. 6 (2016),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/robots_meaningful_human_control_
final.pdf (―An obligation to have meaningful human control would allow for the imposition of
legal liability and avoid the accountability gap associated with fully autonomous weapons.‖).
It will not, unless the current international criminal law standard is changed. A human operator
might make an informed decision, based on sufficient information and training, to deploy a welltested and largely predictable AWS—and, due to its capacity for independent and thus sometimes
unpredictable action, the AWS might nonetheless act in a way that results in a serious violation of
international humanitarian law without anyone involved acting willfully. At that point, it will be
possible to identify which person or people were in putative control of the system, but as no
one—not the deployer, operator, commander, programmer, developer, manufacturer, or the
weapon system itself—can be held liable under international criminal law absent willful action,
the accountability gap remains.
The AWS accountability gap would be best addressed by constructing an international liability
regime of ―war torts‖ to deter serious violations of international humanitarian law, improve
formal mechanisms for the recognition of state fault, and provide compensation to victims.
Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347
(2016).
43. First Additional Protocol, supra note 37, art. 48.

requirement); and must minimize collateral damage and incidental injury (the
feasible precautions or humanity requirement). In many situations, meaningful
human control will usefully augment these humanitarian norms. The more control
an operator exercises over a weapon system or attack, for example, the more likely
she is able to take feasible precautions. This principle is potentially destabilizing,
however, to the extent it might be interpreted to conflict with existing norms and
suggest that they could be sacrificed in the name of ensuring additional control.
Consider the ICRAC‘s definition of meaningful human control, which
requires the human commander or operator to have ―full contextual and situational
awareness of the target area‖ and the ―means for the rapid suspension or abortion
of the attack.‖ If these ―minimum necessary‖ requirements applied to all attacks,
many weapons that have historically or are currently being employed would be
rendered unlawful, to the detriment of both soldiers and civilians. As CNAS notes,
―humans have been employing weapons where they lack perfect, real-time
situational awareness of the target area since at least the invention of the catapult‖
and ―the essence of a projectile weapon, since the first time a human hurled a rock
in anger, is the inability to suspend and abort the attack after launch.‖
Additionally, defensive AWS are uniquely effective precisely because they can
identify, track, target, and engage an incoming threat, possibly before a human
being even knows of its existence. In such situations, requiring ―active cognitive
participation‖ might expose troops to unnecessary levels of risk.
Not only does the ICARC‘s definition ―articulate an idealized version of
human control divorced from the reality of warfare,‖ it actually threatens to
undermine fundamental humanitarian norms governing targeting. Consider a
commander deciding between employing a precision-guided munition and a

44. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
45. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
46. Cf. UNIDIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (observing that the principle of meaningful
human control usefully ―turns our attention away from speculation about technological
development and future capabilities and toward articulating the expectation that the development
and use of emerging technologies will conform to established norms of responsibility,
accountability, legality, and other principles of international humanitarian and human rights
law‖).
47. ICRAC Statement, supra note 21.
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human-piloted bomber to attack a target. In many cases, the former would be far
preferable for both sides in a conflict. Not only does increased distance between
troops and a target reduce physical and psychological risk to the side orchestrating
the attack, the accuracy of precision-guided munitions reduces the need to use
excessive lethal force when attacking from afar, which in turn lessens the
likelihood of collateral damage. Similarly, ―autonomous weapon systems promise
a next-generation combination of distance, accuracy, and lethality‖—which may
decrease risks both to the combatants fielding an AWS and to civilians. These
potential gains in human safety should not be sacrificed to an overly-strict
interpretation of what constitutes meaningful human control.
V. CONCLUSION
In large part because of its inherent imprecision, the principle of ―meaningful
human control‖ can fruitfully advance the conversation regarding the appropriate
regulation of autonomous (and other) weapon systems, especially if it augments
existing humanitarian norms governing targeting. But these norms—the
distinction, proportionality, and feasible precaution requirements—should serve as
an interpretative floor. Any definition of meaningful human control that would
prioritize human control at the cost of increased risk to soldiers and civilians must
be rejected outright.
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